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Abstract
We construct a model of revolution and transition to democracy under individualistic and 
collectivist cultures. The main result is that, despite facing potentially more challenging 
collective action problems, countries with individualistic cultures are more likely to end up 
adopting democracy earlier than countries with collectivist cultures. Our empirical analy-
sis suggests a strong and robust association between individualistic cultures and average 
polity scores and durations of democracy, even after controlling for other determinants of 
democracy emphasized in the literature. We provide evidence that countries with collectiv-
ist cultures also are more likely to experience autocratic breakdowns and transitions from 
autocracy to autocracy.
Keywords Culture · Individualism · Collectivism · Democratization · Collective action
JEL Classification H1 · P48 · Z1
1 Introduction
Janos Kornai’s work on economic systems does not ignore the role of political institu-
tions. Whereas in Economics of Shortage, he mentioned paternalism as the source of soft 
budget constraints, in his later, more complete contribution (written under conditions of 
freedom) The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, he mentioned com-
munist party rule as the source and pillar of the socialist economic system and its phenom-
ena. When discussing the success of Chinese economic reforms, especially in comparison 
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with the less spectacular economic reforms that took place in Central and Eastern Europe, 
Kornai emphasized the fundamental role of freedom and democracy that was absent in 
China despite the growth miracle.1 Nevertheless, he never discussed why China did not 
become a democracy. Furthermore, the experience of China (but also Vietnam, Singapore 
or even Thailand) appears to challenge modernization theory (Lipset 1959; Przeworski and 
Limongi 1997) according to which countries tend to become, or remain, democracies as 
they develop economically.
To put that puzzle in a perspective, we note that, according to Freedom House (1999), 
no single liberal democracy with universal suffrage existed in the world in 1900. By 2000, 
120 of the world’s 192 nations were liberal democracies. Recent developments tend to sug-
gest that it is far from clear whether worldwide convergence towards democracy will con-
tinue. Autocratic tendencies have appeared in democratic countries such as Russia, Turkey, 
Hungary and Poland, to name a few.2 A key question is whether China, the biggest coun-
try in the world with miraculous growth over the last four decades, will evolve towards 
democracy. So far, to put it mildly, little evidence points in that direction. Reasons thus can 
be found for being skeptical that countries should all become democratic as they develop 
economically. Could modernization theories have overlooked slow-moving forces such as 
culture that may facilitate or hamper transition to democracy? Strikingly, although culture 
often is considered a bedrock of many social and economic processes, the role of culture in 
democratization largely has been ignored until now.
In this paper, we present a simple formal model of democratization that includes the 
individualistic-collectivist dimension of culture. A key difference between those cultural 
types is that a collectivist culture creates stronger pressure towards conformity and stronger 
aversion for radical institutional innovation. We show that, starting from an initial situa-
tion of autocracy, a collectivist society is less likely to adopt a democratic regime than an 
individualistic society, irrespective of whether a collectivist culture may be more effective 
in overcoming collective action problems. In our model, collectivist societies often end up 
in equilibrium having a “good” autocracy, i.e., an autocracy that does not act in a predatory 
way toward its citizens because good autocracies tend not to be overthrown by collectiv-
ist societies, unlike those of individualistic societies. That outcome occurs because of the 
stronger aversion for radical institutional innovation in collectivist societies. Furthermore, 
if political institutions can influence culture over time, our central prediction continues to 
hold: collectivist societies are less likely to end up with democracy. Note that those results 
do not follow automatically from a congruence between individualistic values and democ-
racy. Countries with individualistic cultures must still overcome collective action problems 
to transition from autocracy to democracy, which is a non-trivial barrier. Indeed, we do 
observe countries with relatively high individualism scores and low democracy scores 
(e.g., Morocco). Yet, a striking result of our model is that even if one assumes that the col-
lective action problem is much more acute in individualistic societies, such societies are 
still more likely to end up with democracy over time than collectivist societies.
2 Kornai has been a keen observer of such tendencies in the post-socialist world. Kornai (2016) describes 
in detail the changes made by Orban to Hungary’s political and economic system. Kornai (2015) draws a 
distinction between autocracy and dictatorship, wherein the former lies between democracy and dictator-
ship, a distinction usually not made.
1 This point is reiterated in his remarks at the occasion of the symposium for his 90th birthday; see Kornai 
(2018).
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We test the predictions of the model empirically, using the well-known Hofstede meas-
ure of individualism-collectivism. We find a strong and robust effect of individualism on 
average polity scores between 1980 and 2010. A one standard deviation increase in the 
individualism score is associated with as much as a four-point increase in polity scores, a 
large magnitude. That result holds even when we control for all of the variables that have 
been used in the literature on democratization, including measures of economic develop-
ment. We also document evidence that countries with collectivist cultures experience auto-
cratic breakdowns more frequently, suggesting less collective action failure in collectivist 
cultures. We do find strong evidence that in collectivist cultures, conditional on autocratic 
breakdown, transition to autocracy is more likely while in individualistic cultures, transi-
tion to democracy is more likely. While the main result is tested using the well-known pol-
ity data, those last results are tested using the new data on autocracies and autocratic transi-
tions assembled by Geddes et al. (2014). Interestingly, other cultural variables, such as trust 
or other cultural dimensions constructed by Hofstede (2001)—power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, masculinity, long-term orientation—do not have a significant or a robust effect 
on average polity scores, whereas the effect of individualism is very robust.
Because two-way causality may exist between democracy and culture, we apply instru-
mental variables to study the effect of culture on democratization. The first instrumental 
variable is a measure of historical pathogen prevalence. That variable has been argued (see, 
e.g., Fincher et al. 2008; Murray and Schaller 2010) to have a direct effect on the choice 
of collectivist culture as stronger pathogen prevalence created better survival prospects for 
communities that adopted more collectivist values, imposing stronger limits on individual-
istic behavior, being less open to foreigners and placing strong emphasis on tradition and 
stability of social norms. The second instrumental variable is a measure of genetic distance 
between countries based on differences in cross-sectional frequencies of blood types. That 
instrument is adopted as a proxy for vertical cultural transmission from parents to children. 
Since the genetic pool evolves relatively slowly and it is unlikely that neutral genetic mark-
ers (e.g., blood types) changed since the industrial revolution, one can use genetic distance 
in terms of such markers to instrument cultural differences.3 Because of the pitfalls related 
to cross-country regressions, we must be careful in interpreting the instrumental variable 
regression results as causal. Nevertheless, our findings are consistent with culture playing 
an important role in transitions from autocracy to democracy as well as in transitions from 
autocracy to autocracy.
2  Contribution to the literature
Our paper contributes to an immense body of work on the determinants of democratiza-
tion. Since Lipset’s (1959) seminal work, a large literature, both theoretical and empirical, 
has been devoted to understanding the determinants of democratization. Lipset emphasized 
3 More recently, some scholars have claimed to have found a direct link between genetic endowments and 
political behavior, such as political participation and ideology (Fowler et al. 2008; Hatemi and McDermott 
2012). Those studies focus, however, on individual political behavior and individual political psychology, 
not on how average genetic endowments affect a collectivity or a country’s culture. That difference is very 
important. The individual approach postulates a direct connection between an individual’s genetic endow-
ment and that individual’s psychology or political behavior. In contrast, we use the correlation between 
cultural traits and genetic distance to address the potential endogeneity of culture.
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the role of economic development and, thus, not surprisingly, most disputes on democra-
tization have been about whether economic development is a fundamental determinant of 
democracy. Lipset was taking a broad view of economic and social modernization creating 
conditions for increases in the demand for democracy. In recent years, debates about the 
importance of economic development have been revived after the work of Przeworski and 
Limongi (1997). Using data between 1950 and 1990 for 135 countries, they showed that 
the correlation between income and democracy was explained not so much by economic 
development leading to democratization, but rather by the fact that once countries have 
achieved a certain level of economic development, they usually never revert to authori-
tarian regimes. Countries could opt for democratic or dictatorial regimes for reasons that 
are unrelated to economic development, but if richer countries develop stable democracies, 
one will see a strong correlation between income per capita and democracy.4 Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2006) argued that democratization mostly was an elite strategy to commit 
to redistributive transfers in response to revolutionary threats.5 Some of the recent studies 
question causation from development to democracy or even the correlation between the 
two. Acemoglu et al. (2005, 2008) showed that the relationship between income (or educa-
tion) and democracy, mainly is a feature of cross-sectional data and that when performing 
panel data analysis, one ceases to find a significant relationship between those variables.6 
Acemoglu et al. (2014) in recent work even found that democracy affects growth, a conclu-
sion opposite to that of modernization theory. On the other hand, Boix and Stokes (2003) 
found that by taking data far enough into the past (to the second half of the nineteenth 
century), one can recover a significant relation between income per capita and democracy. 
Treisman (2012) also found an effect of economic development in the medium to long run, 
with democratic transitions happening more often after the exit of a dictator.
To find a mention of cultural determinants of democracy, one has to go back to Almond 
and Verba (1963), who emphasized the importance of civic culture as a prerequisite for 
democracy in a comparative study of five countries (Italy, Germany, the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Mexico). Inglehart (2002) and, more recently, Inglehart and Weizel 
(2005), using the World Values Survey, argued that modernization leads to changes in val-
ues towards more self-expression and stronger emphasis on individual liberty.7 According 
to them, those changes in values underlie stronger support for democracy. Their study is 
the closest to ours because the values they emphasize are close to individualism as we 
define it (more on that below). However, their focus is not the effect of culture on democ-
racy. Instead, they emphasize cultural changes brought about by modernization. Our 
approach is different: we take culture as slow-moving (Roland 2004),8 thus potentially 
7 See also Putnam et al. (1994) on how a strong culture of civil engagement affects the quality of govern-
ment.
8 A large empirical literature shows that culture has a very strong inertia, from research showing the long-
run effects of cultural differences between groups of early US settlers (see Fischer 1989; Grosjean 2014) to 
research showing the persistence of culture of ancestors’ countries of origin among US immigrants (see, 
e.g., Guiso et al. 2006; Tabellini 2008; Algan and Cahuc 2010).
4 Persson and Tabellini (2009) specified a theoretical model and showed empirical support for a theory of 
positive feedback between the capital stock of democratic experience and economic development. Persson 
(2005) showed that the form of democracy mattered for income growth: the introduction of parliamentary 
democracy with proportional electoral rules produced the most growth-promoting policies.
5 Bruckner and Ciccone (2011) found that transitory negative income shocks related to drought have a pos-
itive effect on democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa.
6 Grosjean and Senik (2011) found no link between income and support for democracy in the context of 
transition countries.
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affecting faster-moving variables, such as political institutions. We do not deny that cul-
ture may be affected by political institutions and other variables, which is why we try to 
isolate the effect of culture on political institutions by adopting an instrumental variables 
method. While our research suggests that individualism affects both income per capita and 
democracy, we do not rule out a separate effect of income on democracy. Furthermore, we 
document that, in contrast to other measures of culture (e.g., religion, trust), individual-
ism is a robust predictor of democracy. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the 
first to explore systematically how culture (individualism) can influence democratization 
processes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 3, we present the model. In 
Sect. 4, we present the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes.
3  The model
Our model embeds cultural differences in a model of democratization and revolution. Con-
sider a polity composed of two classes of infinitely lived citizens: rich and poor. The size of 
the population is normalized to one. The rich are present in proportion 𝛿 < 1
2
 . The average 
income of the rich is yR = 휃y∕훿 , whereas the average income of the poor, present in propor-
tion 1 − 𝛿 > 1
2
 , is yP = (1 − 휃)y∕(1 − 훿) , where y is average income ( y = 훿yR + (1 − 훿)yP) 
and 휃 ( ≥ 1∕2) is an indicator of income inequality.
The initial regime is autocratic. We will make the distinction between good and bad 
autocrats. We assume that a bad autocrat acts in a predatory way and takes away all income 
from all citizens. Therefore, the after-tax income of the rich and poor is assumed to be 
equal to zero. Our assumptions represent a clear simplification of reality.9 We assume that 
a good autocrat does not tax or redistribute. That assumption likewise is not realistic but 
helps to distinguish a good from a bad autocrat, a distinction that is in our view important 
to make. In the model, everybody, rich and poor, prefers good autocrats to bad autocrats. 
A good autocrat is drawn randomly with probability 훼 and bad autocrat with probability 
(1 − 훼) . We assume that a ruler stays in power forever unless a revolt succeeds in over-
throwing him or her.10
In each period, citizens are able to overcome their collective action problem and to over-
throw the ruler with probability qk ( k = I for individualism or k = C for collectivism). We 
do not need the results below to make any particular assumptions about the ranking of 
qk between different cultures. A natural assumption might be qC > qI : a collectivist cul-
ture can help overcome free-rider problems if a social norm exists of just revolt against an 
unjust autocratic ruler. Indeed, people in a collectivist culture will conform to the social 
norm and derive social status or other rewards from doing so (failure to conform may lead 
to being ostracized). On the other hand, one also can make an argument that qC < qI . In 
collectivist societies, allegiances are based on tribal or clan affiliation. If various tribes or 
clans deeply distrust one another and are in conflict, they may have a more difficult time 
overcoming collective action problems than people in those individualistic cultures that 
have dense civil society networks and cultures of citizen participation.
9 On predatory states, see Vahabi (2016a, b). On differences between autocratic regimes, see the distinction 
made by McGuire and Olson (1996) on roving bandits versus stationary bandits.
10 See Tullock (1974) on the costs and benefits of revolts.
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In periods when citizens are able to overcome their collective action problems, usually 
called revolutionary conditions, citizens in all cultures may choose to overthrow the regime 
or to keep it. While it seems obvious that citizens will want to overthrow a bad autocrat, it 
is not a priori obvious that they want to replace a good autocrat.
Since the poor are in the majority, the decision to engage or not in collective action 
is theirs. Even if the rich would not want to engage in collective action, we assume that 
the decisions of the poor are the ones that matter.11 If they engage in collective action, 
they will either replace the old autocrat with a new, possibly good, autocrat or introduce a 
radical institutional innovation and replace autocracy with democracy. In case of success-
ful collective action, it is assumed that an autocrat will be replaced, with probability 휎k , by 
another autocrat (possibly a good one, which happens with probability 훼 ) and that he will 
be replaced by democracy with probability 
(
1 − 휎k
)
 . We assume that 𝜎C > 𝜎I ; that assump-
tion will matter for our results. One justification for the assumption is that collectivist cul-
tures have higher levels of conformism and lower propensities to engage in institutional 
innovations. Another, probably deeper, justification is that collectivist values place heavier 
emphasis on the difference between a benevolent ruler and a bad ruler, on political stabil-
ity and the capacity of a good ruler wisely to arbitrate disputes between different clans and 
groups. In contrast, individualistic values emphasize individual freedom, equality of citi-
zens before the law, and limited government.12
Note that in our model, uncertainty exists about what institutional regime will follow 
the decision to revolt. The only decision taken is to engage in collective action, but the 
outcome is uncertain. That aspect of the model seems quite realistic. For example, during 
the Arab Spring of 2011, it was not clear whether democratic regimes or new autocratic 
regimes with changed rulers were going to emerge. As of 2016, such uncertainty still not 
yet been fully resolved in various countries of the region. The assumption stated above 
about the values of 휎k means that the uncertainty over the outcome of collective action 
is influenced by deep cultural parameters. Figure 1 summarizes the timing of actions and 
outcomes.
The main cultural differences in the model (differences in qk and 휎k ) undoubtedly are 
in reduced form because existing theories of how collective action problems are overcome 
and theories of the dynamics of collective action are far from satisfactory. Nevertheless, 
the current model makes some progress in our knowledge of institutional change by intro-
ducing a cultural component into theories of revolution and democratization.
To simplify the algebra, we assume that once democracy is introduced, it remains in 
place forever. We thus rule out by assumption coups orchestrated by the rich to abolish 
democracy.13 Under democracy, the poor are in the majority and tax the rich. They are bet-
ter off under democracy than under even a good autocratic ruler, whereas the rich generally 
will prefer the latter since no redistribution occurs under a good autocrat. Because the poor 
control a voting majority, only their decisions matter for the determination of the political 
11 This part of the model should not be interpreted too literally. In many regime changes, some of the elite 
spearhead revolutions, coups and abrupt regime changes in the name of the people. Popular support for 
regime change is nevertheless critical for its success.
12 See Gorodnichenko and Roland (2012) for a fuller discussion of the cross-cultural differences between 
individualism and collectivism and their implications for economic and institutional behavior. Note also 
that liberal ideologies that defend democracy are based on individualist values.
13 Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) consider a model where the rich change the regime by a coup, and 
we do not incorporate that feature in this model so as not to introduce complications on an issue that has 
already been covered in the literature.
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regime and, hence, we can focus on the poor’s decisions and value functions. The value 
function for income for the poor under democracy is:
where yP is the income of the poor, 휏 = argmax
{
yP + 휏 ∗
(
y − yP
)
− C(휏)y
}
 and C(휏)y is 
the distortionary cost from redistributive taxation. The optimal tax rate thus is the one that 
maximizes the net income of the poor.
Under a predatory ruler, the poor always will prefer to revolt. However, under a good 
autocrat, the decision to revolt may lead to democracy with a certain probability, which 
makes the poor better off, but it may also lead to the installation of a predatory ruler.
Under a predatory ruler, the value function for the poor is:
where B stands for the predatory, bad ruler and G for the good ruler. In words, income is 
extracted from the poor today; in the future, with probability qk collective action is success-
ful, in which case with probability 휎k another autocratic regime (good or bad autocrat with 
probability 훼 and 1 − 훼 respectively) replaces it and, with probability ( 1 − 휎k) , the sequel 
is democracy. Note that VG depends on whether the poor decide to revolt against a good 
autocrat. The value function for the poor under a good autocrat if they decide not to revolt 
( N ) is:
whereas if they decide to revolt ( R ), it is:
Note that the expression for VGR is similar to that of VB . Indeed, we have that
We can then derive the following proposition.
Proposition 1 A threshold level ?̄?k < 1 exists, above which no revolutionary action is 
organized and below which revolutionary action always will be taken under a good ruler.
Proof of proposition 1 See the “Appendix”.
Proposition 1 says that in a very collectivist culture (high 휎C ), a revolt never will 
be mounted against a good autocrat, whereas in a very individualistic culture (low 휎I ), 
revolution is certain. That result is interesting because, even if collectivist cultures were 
better able than individualistic cultures to overcome barriers to collective action, such 
organizational efforts would be trumped by stronger conformism (high 휎C).
The comparative statics likewise is interesting. By doing the appropriate calculations, 
one can see that when 휎k is sufficiently high (close to 1), a larger qk will strengthen 
VD =
yP + 휏 ∗
(
y − yP
)
− C(휏)y
1 − 훽
,
VB = 0 + 훽
{
qk휎k
[
훼VG + (1 − 훼)VB
]
+ qk
(
1 − 휎k
)
VD +
(
1 − qk
)
VB
}
,
VGN =
yP
1 − 훽
,
VGR = y
P + 훽
{
qk휎k
[
훼VGR + (1 − 훼)VB
]
+ qk
(
1 − 휎k
)
VD +
(
1 − qk
)
VGR
}
.
VGR − VB = y
P + 훽
(
1 − qk
)(
VGR − VB
)
=
yP
1 − 훽
(
1 − qk
) .
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preferences against revolt, whereas when 휎k is sufficiently low (close to 0), a larger qk 
will raise the expected payoffs from revolting. The latter result is intuitive but the for-
mer is surprising. It means that increases in the ability to overcome collective action 
problems lead to preferences against revolt when the degree of conformity is high. 
Intuitively, a tradeoff is involved in the decision to revolt. With some probability the 
revolt will lead to democracy, which will enhance poor’s welfare, but with some prob-
ability, revolution will lead to a bad autocrat. When qk is high (and 휎k is high), the latter 
becomes a more probable event.
Another comparative static result of the model is that less income inequality (low 휃 ) 
reduces the advantages of democracy over a good autocracy. In a fully egalitarian society 
with a good autocrat, the model generates no advantage from adopting democracy.
We can draw several other implications from this basic initial analysis. A first implica-
tion is that, if collectivist societies have larger q s, they will revolt more frequently when 
ruled by a bad autocrat. That conclusion follows because all cultures will revolt against bad 
autocrats, but collectivist cultures will better be able to overcome their collective action 
problems. In his famous History of Government from the Earliest Times, Finer (1997, pp. 
523, 799) observed that many more peasant revolts erupted in ancient China than in Europe 
in the pre-industrial world. While we do not have data good enough to test Finer’s observa-
tion directly, it nevertheless is interesting and worth further examination. In the empirical 
section, we will use available data to examine collective action in different cultures. A sec-
ond implication of the model is that, independent of the level of qk , having a good autocrat 
in a collectivist society will lead to more regime stability under autocracy because of the 
dearth of revolts.
The main result we would like to test and what also is the most interesting one, follows 
from Proposition 1. More collectivist societies characterized by a high 휎 tend not to revolt 
when they are ruled by a good autocrat. More individualistic societies characterized by a 
low 휎 will tend to decide to revolt even if q is very low. As a result, individualistic societies 
unambiguously are more likely to end up adopting democracy over time. That conclusion 
is expressed in Proposition 2:
Fig. 1  Timing of events in the model
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Proposition 2 Independently of the level of qk , societies with a 휎k less than ?̄?k have a 
strictly higher probability of ending up with democracy than societies with a higher 휎k , 
exceeding ?̄?k , as long as 𝛼 > 0.
Proof of proposition 2 See the “Appendix”.
Intuitively, under a good autocrat, no revolt will be organized in a collectivist culture, 
in contrast to what is likely in an individualistic culture. The non-intuitive part of the 
proposition is that however small (but still non-zero) is qk, individualistic cultures are 
more likely to end up with democracies. The reason is that collectivist societies will 
tend, with positive probability, to replace a bad autocrat with another autocrat rather 
than with democracy, as long as 𝛼 > 0 . If they get a good autocrat, they will not revolt 
again; if they are ruled by a bad autocrat, they will revolt but will, with positive prob-
ability, put another autocrat in place. However high qC is and however low qI is, the 
result of proposition 2 always holds.
In the model, culture is exogenous to institutions. What happens if we allow culture 
to be influenced by existing institutions? Suppose that we permit the cultural parameters 
of our model to change as a function of the length of time spent under a given regime. 
Indeed, Persson and Tabellini (2009) provide evidence that pro-democracy values are 
reinforced over time the longer people live under such a regime. Assume, thus, in the 
framework of our model, that 휎k declines over time after democracy has been intro-
duced. Assume also that 휎k increases over time under a “good” autocratic regime and 
that those changes materialize only under peaceful conditions, i.e., under conditions 
wherein no revolt takes place. It follows that the results of our model will not change. 
Indeed, democracy and “good” autocracy are both absorbing states, depending on the 
values of 휎k . Once democracy has been reached, it will not be reversed; variations in 휎k 
will not modify our conclusions. On the other hand, no revolt will occur under a good 
autocrat if 휎k is above ?̄?k . If living under a good autocrat increases 휎k further, then no 
revolt against the good autocrat will be organized. The results of the model thus are 
unchanged if we allow culture to move slowly in such regimes. Note that while we can-
not measure “good” and “bad’ autocracies directly, we can test whether more collec-
tivist societies tend to have more autocracy-to-autocracy transitions than autocracy-to-
democracy transitions; we implement such a test in the empirical section.
Before turning to the data, it is useful to compare the predictions of our model with 
the results of mainstream models, such as that of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). The 
current model shares certain basic features with the Acemoglu–Robinson model: two 
groups, the elite and the poor, are considered, a Markov structure is assumed, and the 
effect of income inequality is similar. The differences are, however, conceptually very 
substantial. In their model, relevant decisions are taken by the elite. In our model, deci-
sions (to revolt or not) are taken by the mass of people, or their representatives within 
the elite, and uncertainty over the outcomes of collective action plays a much larger role. 
The Acemoglu–Robinson model incorporates absolutely no cultural component and the 
elites decide between either endogenously redistributing income to the poor when they 
threaten revolt, in order to avert a revolution, or to establish democracy as a credible 
commitment to redistribution. The probability of success of collective action plays an 
important role in their model. The more likely successful collective action is, the more 
likely it is that the elites will prefer to redistribute income to the poor to avoid a revolu-
tion. On the other hand, if that probability is lower, they will choose instead to establish 
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democracy to avert a revolt. In contrast, in our model the collective action’s probability 
of success ( qk ) does not play a significant role in determining long-term outcomes. It is 
instead the cultural parameter, 휎k that determines the long-run probability that a country 
adopts democracy. Furthermore, to the extent that collective action is easier in collec-
tivist cultures (we provide below some evidence consistent with that claim), our model 
predicts that a transition from autocracy to democracy is less likely in countries with 
collectivist cultures, which, as we discuss below is consistent with the data, while mod-
els in the Acemoglu–Robinson spirit predict the opposite result.
4  Empirical analysis
We now turn to the empirical analysis of the link between culture and democratization. 
Because we have no time series for our data on culture and, in particular, on individualism 
and collectivism. Moreover, because the available observations are at the country level, our 
empirical investigation will, by necessity, mostly be devoted to cross-country analysis.
4.1  Data
We take the Polity IV index averaged between 1980 and 2010 as a measure of democratiza-
tion.14 Polity scores take values between − 10 and + 10. Negative scores are for autocra-
cies and the more negative the score the more autocratic the regime. Positive scores are 
for democracies and a score of + 10 goes to fully institutionalized democracies. Note that 
many countries have a score of + 10. Taking an average over 30 years is useful because 
many countries switched from autocracy to democracy during that period and the average 
score reflects the time since democracy was established as well as the quality of democ-
racy. This period covers many democratization episodes that took place during the so-
called third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991) but it does not cover yet the results 
of the Arab Spring. Although Polity IV data go back much further in time, we focus on the 
more recent period because our cultural data were generated starting from the 1970s. The 
geographical distribution of polity scores is shown in Panel A of Fig. 2.
To measure individualism/collectivism, we use the country level data developed by 
Hofstede (2001) who initially used surveys of IBM employees in about 30 countries in the 
1960s. To avoid cultural biases in the way questions were framed, the survey was trans-
lated into local languages by a team of English and local language speakers. With new 
waves of surveys and replication studies, Hofstede’s measure of individualism has been 
expanded to more than 90 countries.15 The individualism score measures the extent to 
which it is believed that individuals are supposed to take care of themselves as opposed 
to being strongly integrated and loyal to a cohesive group. Individuals in countries with a 
high level of the individualism index value personal freedom and status, while individu-
als in countries with a low level of the index value harmony and conformity. Hofstede’s 
index, as well as the measures of individualism from other studies, uses a broad array of 
survey questions to establish cultural values. Factor analysis is used to summarize data and 
14 Polity V is still in development as we write this paper.
15 The most current version of the data is available at http://www.geert -hofst ede.com/. The timing of this 
and other variables is provided in “Appendix Table 9”.
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construct indices. In Hofstede’s analysis, the index of individualism is the first factor in 
work goal questions about the value of personal time, freedom, interesting and fulfilling 
work, etc. This component loads positively on valuing individual freedom, opportunity, 
achievement, advancement, recognition and negatively on valuing harmony, cooperation, 
relations with superiors. Although Hofstede’s data were initially collected mostly with the 
purpose of understanding differences in IBM’s corporate culture, the main advantage of 
Hofstede’s measure of individualism is that it has been validated in a large number of stud-
ies. The ranking of countries across various studies and measures (see Hofstede (2001) for 
a review) is very stable. Hofstede’s measure has been used extensively in the cross-cultural 
psychology literature, which views the individualism-collectivism cleavage as the main 
cultural cleavage across countries (see Heine 2008). The Hofstede data also correlate quite 
well with the more recent data by Schwartz (1994, 2006).16 Panel B of Fig. 2 shows the 
geographic distribution of individualism scores.
Empirically, the causality between individualism and democracy can go both ways. 
One can argue, as we do in this paper, that individualistic culture has a positive effect on 
democracy, but one can also make an argument in the other direction: the more people live 
under democracy and are accustomed to the protection of the rights of individual citizens, 
the more they espouse an individualistic world view with its values of freedom and oppor-
tunity, equality of citizens before the law and constraints on the executive (see for example 
Persson and Tabellini 2009). As we showed above, this does not change the results of the 
model, but would affect the empirical analysis. Ideally, we would like to have a measure 
of individualism and collectivism much earlier in time, prior to democratization history. 
Unfortunately, we do not have such data. We are therefore forced, in an attempt to deal with 
the potential endogeneity of culture, to use instrumental variables.
Our main instrumental variable is based on epidemiological data put together by Mur-
ray and Schaller (2010) for 230 geopolitical regions (mostly nations) on historical patho-
gen prevalence in the early-to-mid twentieth century, extending the work of Fincher et al. 
(2008).17 These historical data are very important because they give a good idea of the 
pathogen environment populations were facing in the past, including the very distant past, 
and in any case before the post-WWII epidemiological revolution when big public health 
changes started to occur. Panel C of Fig. 2 shows the geographical distribution of historic 
pathogen prevalence. Given a strong correlation between pathogen prevalence and collec-
tivism, the above studies argue that stronger pathogen prevalence pushed communities to 
adopt more collectivist values emphasizing tradition, putting stronger limits on individual 
behavior, and showing less openness towards foreigners. Collectivism is thus understood 
as a defense mechanism created to cope with greater pathogen prevalence. Obviously, his-
torical pathogen prevalence is only one of the possible reasons for the adoption of col-
lectivism. Nevertheless, as an instrumental variable, it can provide a very useful role in 
measuring the effect of individualism on democratization. Historical pathogen prevalence 
can also be argued to satisfy the exclusion restriction since historical pathogen prevalence 
is not likely to have a direct effect on political regime choice. Indeed, one cannot claim 
that autocracy is more efficient than democracy, or vice versa, in dealing with pathogen 
17 The study use 9 pathogens: leishmanias, trypanosomes, malaria, schistosomes, filariae, dengue, typhus, 
leprosy and tuberculosis.
16 Schwartz’s cultural dimensions of intellectual and affective autonomy correlate positively with indi-
vidualism while the dimension of embeddedness correlates negatively with individualism. These cultural 
dimensions are also interpreted in a very similar way as Hofstede’s individualism-collectivism index.
 Public Choice
1 3
prevalence. Autocracy suffers from lack of transparency, as was seen in China recently 
with the SARS and COVID-19 epidemic, and is not necessarily more efficient in dealing 
with a humanitarian disaster, as was the case with the catastrophic handling of the 2008 
Fig. 2  Geographical distribution of individualism, polity scores, and pathogen prevalence
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massive flooding from cyclone Nargis in Myanmar. Likewise, democracy may or may not 
lack speed in response to a major health epidemic.18
In some specifications we use another instrumental variable in conjunction with histori-
cal pathogen prevalence: the Euclidian distance between the frequency of blood types A 
and B in a given country and the frequency of those blood types in the USA, which is the 
most individualistic country in our sample. This is a measure of genetic distance. To the 
extent that culture is transmitted mainly from parents to children (see for example Fer-
nandez et al. 2004; Fernandez and Fogli 2006, and the models by Bisin and Verdier 2000, 
2001), so are genes. Populations that interbreed a lot should be genetically and culturally 
close because a similar parental transmission mechanism is at work in both cases. There-
fore, measures of genetic distance can be seen as a proxy measure of differences in cultural 
values. Note that these are “neutral” genetic markers that have no direct effect on fitness 
(i.e., ability to think, run, work, etc.) and thus economic, cultural or political outcomes. 
Because genetic pools evolve slowly, these markers are very unlikely to be affected by eco-
nomic outcomes, and thus we can exclude reverse causality in our instrumental variable 
estimates. To be clear, this particular identification strategy does not postulate that the first 
stage captures a direct causal effect between genes (here blood types) and culture. Instead, 
this strategy exploits the correlation between cultural and genetic transmission from pat-
ents to offspring. We combine this variable with the other instrumental variable mentioned 
above and apply standard statistical tests for the exclusion restriction. Our measure of 
genetic distance successfully passes these tests, and one can thus feel more comfortable 
using it as instrumental variable.19
The genetic data originate from Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994), which provides measured 
genetic markers for roughly 2000 groups of population across the globe. These data contain 
allele frequencies (alleles are variants taken by a gene) for various ethnic groups. Using 
the frequency of blood types is attractive because, apart from being neutral genetic mark-
ers, the frequency of alleles determining blood types is the most widely available genetic 
information and thus we can construct the most comprehensive (in terms of country cover-
age) measure of genetic distance. Since the genetic data are available at the level of ethnic 
groups while our analysis is done at the country level, we have aggregated genetic infor-
mation using ethnic shares of population from Fearon (2003). Gorodnichenko and Roland 
(2017) provide more details on how genetic distance is constructed.20
4.2  Individualism and democracy in cross‑section
We now present the empirical results of the effects of individualism on average polity 
scores. The first three columns of Table 1 report results for the basic OLS and IV regres-
sions. The effect of individualism is strongly significant with OLS and with IV, whether we 
19 Using a smaller sample of countries, Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017) test overidentifying restrictions 
for the blood distance and other genetic instrumental variables with arguably more direct effects on indi-
vidualism and collectivism and find that one cannot reject the null of correct exclusion restrictions.
20 A potential disadvantage of blood type distance as an instrumental variable is that it could be an instru-
ment for other cultural variables, which may also be argued to affect political regime choice. Having two 
plausible instruments is nevertheless an advantage in empirical analysis because one can use formal tests of 
the exclusion restriction.
18 One could argue that higher pathogen prevalence should be correlated with a more centralized form of 
government given the externalities from disease transmission. However, centralization of government is not 
directly related to the type of political regime.
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take only historical pathogen prevalence as an instrument, or together with blood distance. 
Note that in the two IV regressions, the first stage is very significant, indicating no prob-
lem of weak instrument. Moreover, the p value of 0.856 for the overidentifying restriction 
test confirms that one cannot reject the null of the instrumental variables being correctly 
excluded at any standard significance level. Note that the IV coefficients are somewhat 
higher than the OLS coefficient, indicating a potential measurement error. If we take the 
IV coefficient in column 3 as a baseline indicator, it means that a one standard deviation 
increase in individualism (say from Iran to Finland, or Argentina to Switzerland) should 
lead to a 4 point increase in the average polity score.
In columns 4 to 6, we perform the same regressions but include controls for conflict. 
Countries plagued by conflict may indeed be more likely to have democracy suspended or 
eliminated during periods of conflict. We thus include four variables from the International 
Country Risk Guide, averaged between 1985 and 2009. These variables measure percep-
tions of risk for (1) cross-border conflict, (2) civil disorder, (3) ethnic tensions and (4) war. 
Even with more controls, the IV first stages are strong and the p-value for the overidenti-
fying restriction is far above conventional significance levels. Note that the inclusion of 
controls for conflict tends to increase the size of the coefficient for individualism. We will 
include these four controls in the rest of our empirical specification to control for these 
potentially confounding factors.
One may be concerned that, perhaps, controlling for other cultural dimensions can 
eliminate statistical and economic significance of the individualism-democracy relation-
ship. For example, Hofstede identified four other cultural dimensions: power distance, 
masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation.21 Fish (2002) found a nega-
tive correlation between democracy and Islam. Inglehart (1999) argues that interpersonal 
trust is conducive to stable democracies. In Table 2, we assess whether including these cul-
tural characteristics alters the strength of the individualism-democracy link. Specifically, 
we control for the four additional Hofstede indexes, the share of Muslim population in 
1970 [these data are from Barro and McCleary (2003)], and generalized trust (taken from 
the World Values Survey (WVS); an average value across available waves of the WVS). 
The share of Muslim population has a significantly negative coefficient, which is consist-
ent across specifications.22 The only other cultural characteristic with similar consistency 
across specifications is uncertainty avoidance. Interestingly, although trust, the cultural 
variable the most used by economists, is positively correlated with Polity IV scores, this 
correlation disappears once we control for individualism scores. The magnitude of the 
coefficient on individualism is largely unchanged across specification.
In Table 3, we focus on four key economic factors typically linked to the prevalence of 
democracy: income, institutions, inequality, and natural resource rents. As highlighted in 
21 Power distance measures the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions 
(like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. Uncertainty avoidance measures a 
society’s tolerance for ambiguity. Masculinity measures a preference in society for achievement, heroism, 
assertiveness and material rewards for success. Cultures with high long-term orientation scores are charac-
terized by emphasis on persistence (perseverance), ordering relationships by status, the possibility of having 
many truths (depending on time and context), thrift, and having a sense of shame.
22 When introducing shares of other religions (results not shown), the share of Muslims remains strongly 
negatively significant and is the only strongly robust variable. The share of Jews is typically positively asso-
ciated to democracy. Given that Jews are a minority in all countries except Israel, the most natural inter-
pretation is that Jews, who have been persecuted in the past, have migrated to the more stable democratic 
countries in the world.
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the introduction, since Lipset (1959), discussions on the determinants of democracy have 
turned around measures of economic development. We use the log of income (at purchas-
ing power parity) per worker in 2000 from the Penn World Tables as a control for the level 
of economic development to maximize the coverage of countries.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and others argue that extractive/non-inclusive institu-
tions create barriers for transitions to democracy.23 To quantify the quality of institutions, 
we follow Acemoglu et  al. (2001) and measure the quality of institutions as the score 
for protection against expropriation rights from the ICRG averaged over the 1985–2009 
period.
Table 1  Individualism and democratization
Basic OLS and IV regressions
The dependent variable is the average polity score for the 1980–2010 period from the Polity IV data base. 
Individualism is Hofstede’s index of individualism. A larger value of the index corresponds to a greater 
level of individualism. The four conflict variables (low risk of: cross-border conflict, civil disorder, ethnic 
tensions and war) are taken from the International Country Risk Guide and are averaged between 1985 and 
2009. A higher score means a lower risk of the variable. Instrumental variables for individualism: historical 
pathogens is the Historical Pathogen prevalence index from Murray and Schaller (2010); blood distance is 
the Euclidian distance of frequency of blood types A and B in a given country relative to their frequency in 
the USA. Over-id test p-value reports the p-value for the overidentifying restriction tests that instruments 
are correctly excluded. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Dependent variable: 
polity score
OLS IV pathogens IV blood dis-
tance + patho-
gens
OLS IV pathogens IV blood dis-
tance + path-
ogens
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individualism 0.130*** 0.201*** 0.199*** 0.160*** 0.278*** 0.250***
(0.018) (0.028) (0.026) (0.025) (0.055) (0.042)
Low risk of:
 Cross-border 
conflict
0.137 − 0.218 − 0.132
(1.408) (1.422) (1.403)
 Civil disorder − 2.152* − 4.443*** − 3.884***
(1.116) (1.573) (1.320)
 Ethnic tensions 0.944** 0.855* 0.877*
(0.426) (0.479) (0.456)
 War 1.670 2.845 2.559
(1.907) (1.877) (1.854)
Observations 96 96 96 92 92 92
R2 0.236 0.166 0.170 0.334 0.196 0.255
1st stage F-stat 95.73 51.18 42.19 28.81
1st stage Partial  R2 0.445 0.515 0.277 0.392
Overid test p-value 0.856 0.319
23 Acemoglu et al. (2008) claim that income has no effect on democracy and that the comovement between 
these two variables is determined by institutions (the rule of law) that affect both democracy and successful 
economic development.
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Table 3  Individualism and democratization with controls for income, institutions, rents and inequality
The dependent variable is the average polity score for the 1980–2010 period from the Polity IV data base. 
Individualism is Hofstede’s index of individualism. A larger value of the index corresponds to a greater 
Dependent variable: polity score (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: OLS
 Individualism 0.123*** 0.148*** 0.120*** 0.122*** 0.048*
(0.035) (0.027) (0.027) (0.023) (0.027)
 Log income per worker 2.332*** 3.479***
(0.771) (0.701)
 Protection against expropriation risk 0.309** 0.009
(0.133) (0.133)
 Natural resource rent − 0.233*** − 0.151**
(0.047) (0.057)
 Gini coefficient 0.002 0.057
(0.047) (0.039)
 R2 0.423 0.374 0.498 0.350 0.612
Panel B: IV (historic pathogen prevalence)
 Individualism 0.223*** 0.258*** 0.251*** 0.275*** 0.182**
(0.071) (0.056) (0.062) (0.064) (0.080)
 Log income per worker 1.427 2.103**
(0.896) (0.954)
 Protection against expropriation risk 0.213 0.031
(0.145) (0.140)
 Natural resource rent − 0.161*** − 0.119*
(0.062) (0.064)
 Gini coefficient 0.081 0.100*
(0.066) (0.059)
 R2 0.342 0.260 0.349 0.086 0.458
 1st stage F-stat 17.37 34.72 35.76 26.41 9.473
 1st stage Partial  R2 0.164 0.255 0.248 0.232 0.106
Panel C: IV (historic pathogen prevalence + blood distance)
 Individualism 0.205*** 0.244*** 0.224*** 0.224*** 0.133**
(0.052) (0.040) (0.045) (0.045) (0.053)
 Log income per worker 1.586** 2.602***
(0.795) (0.874)
 Protection against expropriation risk 0.225* 0.023
(0.134) (0.132)
 Natural resource rent − 0.176*** − 0.131**
(0.055) (0.057)
 Gini coefficient 0.055 0.085*
(0.056) (0.049)
 R2 0.368 0.287 0.404 0.233 0.549
 1st stage F-stat 14.79 27.34 25.23 20.29 11.51
 1st stage Partial  R2 0.290 0.398 0.358 0.344 0.244
 Overid test p-value 0.693 0.686 0.401 0.146 0.425
 Observations 91 92 91 87 86
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Inequality has also been argued to be related to democratization. It is a key variable 
in the Acemoglu–Robinson model of democratization. A higher level of inequality makes 
democracy more advantageous, as it will lead to higher levels of redistribution. On the 
other hand, very high levels of inequality may lead the elite to stage coups to eliminate the 
associated tax burden. We measure inequality with the Gini coefficient for net income. This 
variable is taken from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database. To minimize 
measurement errors and short-term volatility in the series, we take a median value of the 
inequality over the 1960–2009 period.
Finally, we employ a measure of natural resource rents. Ross (2001), Wantchekon 
(2002), Dunning (2008) and others provide evidence suggesting that countries rich in natu-
ral resources may tend to be less democratic (“the political resource curse”). To account for 
this determinant, we use the share of natural resource rents in the gross domestic product. 
The share is averaged over 1980–2010 and taken from the World Development Indicators.
From an econometric point of view, these additional controls could be problematic 
in several respects. First, Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011, 2017) document a potential 
causal effect of individualism on income per capita and the quality of institutions. Hence, 
there could be an identification problem when both variables are used as regressors. Sec-
ond, there might be reverse causality, i.e., democracy may affect the level of economic 
development, quality of institutions, level of inequality, and the extractive/non-extractive 
nature of the economy. Such endogeneity not only yields biased estimates of the coef-
ficients on these economic variables but it is also likely to generate a downward bias in 
the estimate of the coefficient on individualism.24 As a result, the estimated coefficient on 
individualism scores likely provides a lower bound for the “true” coefficient. In short, one 
should exercise caution in interpreting regression coefficients in this specification, and 
also bear in mind that the estimated effect of individualism on democracy is likely to be 
understated.
We find that income is indeed positively correlated with Polity IV scores, but control-
ling for income or the other potential determinants does not appear to diminish the strength 
of the relationship between individualism and democracy.25 Note that income is not signifi-
cant in the IV regressions, which could be because of the identification problem mentioned 
level of individualism. Log income per worker: log income (at purchasing power parity) per worker in 
2000 from the Penn World Tables. Protection against expropriation risk (ICRG, average 1985–2009). Gini 
coefficient of net income inequality is from the Standardized World Income Inequality Data base. Natural 
resource rent is the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest 
rents. This variable is measured in percent of GDP (average over 1980-2010) and taken from the World 
Development Indicators. Controls low risk of: cross-border conflict, civil disorder, ethnic tensions and war 
(ICRG, average 1985–2009) are included but not reported. Instrumental variables for individualism: histori-
cal pathogens is the Historical Pathogen prevalence index from Murray and Schaller (2010); blood distance 
is the Euclidian distance of frequency of blood types A and B in a given country relative to their frequency 
in the USA. Over-id test p-value reports the p-value for the overidentifying restriction tests that instruments 
are correctly excluded. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Table 3  (continued)
24 Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017) provide a more detailed discussion of this econometric problem.
25 Results are similar when we use consider measures of output for earlier periods. See “Appendix 
Table 10”.
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above. In contrast, the share of natural resource rents in GDP is robustly negatively corre-
lated with Polity IV scores. Inequality and the quality of institutions seem to have no robust 
association with democracy once we condition on other predictors. Importantly, results in 
Table 3 suggest that, even after controlling for economic factors emphasized in previous 
work, the effect of individualism is large and statistically significant.
In Table 4, we introduce controls for other variables that previous work has associated 
with democracy: education, measures of fractionalization and economic openness. Bour-
guignon and Verdier (2000), for example, build a model where education is both an engine 
of growth and of political participation. Column (1) includes the education index (aver-
age over 1980–2005) from the Human Development Report. We see that individualism and 
education are both statistically significant. In column (2), we introduce measures of ethnic, 
cultural and ethno-linguistic fractionalization from Fearon (2003). None of these variables 
comes out as significant, while individualism remains strongly significant. A similar result 
obtains in column (3) when we control for openness, measured as the ratio of exports plus 
imports to gross domestic product (in current prices, year 2000) and provided by Penn 
World Tables. The IV regressions in columns (4) through (6) yield similar results.
Conditional on the quality of our instrumental variables, we conclude that individualism 
has a significant and robust causal effect on the polity score, even after including controls 
that have been used in the literature, such as conflict, religion, income, institutions, educa-
tion, fractionalization and openness.
4.3  Long‑difference analysis
A potential drawback of cross-sectional analysis of democratization is that it does not 
exploit the time variation of the data. Fortunately, it is possible to perform panel data anal-
ysis of the polity score to understand the dynamics of democratization within a country. 
However, culture is slow-moving and it would be surprising to see important effects of 
culture on the basis of annual time variation. Furthermore, given that cultural attributes 
are likely to be measured with error, panel regressions based on annual data can exacerbate 
attenuation biases (see Griliches and Hausman 1986). Not surprisingly, analyses of cultural 
attributes almost invariably focus on cross-sectional variation.
In an attempt to strike a balance between a desired specification and data constraints, 
we report in Table 5 results based on “long-difference regressions” where the dependent 
variable is the difference in the polity index between 1960 and 2000 and regressors are 
the log difference of income per capita and the difference in the level of primary educa-
tion during that same period as well as individualism and the polity score in 1960. This 
approach enhances the signal-to-noise ratio for the variables and one may thus obtain a 
crisper view of how variables are related. With long differences, individualism remains 
significant, except in columns (1) and (5), but this is mostly due to outliers. The coefficient 
on individualism is significant when we use Huber robust regressions.
4.4  Years of democracy, collective action, collectivism and regime transitions
We have so far used as dependent variable the average polity score between 1980 and 2010. 
An important advantage of this measure is that it incorporates the quality of democracy 
in a country as well as its length after 1980. In this subsection, we try to further explore 
dynamic aspects of the democratization process in the context of our model. In a first step, 
we examine the relationship between individualism and the frequency of democracy, which 
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is defined as the fractions of years a country has continuously had a non-negative polity 
score. One may interpret this frequency as measuring the length of democracy in a country. 
While this measure does not take into account the quality of democracy, one can argue that 
this measure is closer to the model as the latter predicts that individualist cultures will on 
average adopt democracy earlier. We ran the same regressions as in Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 
using length of democracy as the dependent variable and we reached essentially the same 
conclusions as before. In Table 6, we present some of the most salient results.
Column 1 presents the simple OLS regression of fraction of years in democracy on 
individualism. A one standard deviation in the individualism score leads to a 24 percent-
age point increase in the length of democracy. The instrumental variable regression in 
column 2, using historical pathogen prevalence and blood distance to the U.S. as instru-
mental variables predicts a 34 percentage point increase in response to a one standard 
deviation increase in the individualism score. The over-identification test clearly indi-
cates that we cannot reject the null of the IVs being correctly excluded. Columns 3 and 
4 control for log of income per worker, quality of institutions and the share of natural 
Table 4  Individualism and democratization with controls for fractionalization, education, and openness
The dependent variable is the average polity score for the 1980–2010 period from the Polity IV data base. 
Individualism is Hofstede’s index of individualism. A larger value of the index corresponds to a greater 
level of individualism. Ethnical, cultural and ethno-linguistical fractionalization are from Fearon (2003). 
Education: World Bank Human Development Report Education Index (average 1980–2005). Openness: 
Openness ratio in current prices (Penn World Tables). Controls for low risk of: cross-border conflict, civil 
disorder, ethnic tensions and war (ICRG, average 1985–2009) are included but not reported. Instrumental 
variables for individualism: historical pathogens is the Historical Pathogen prevalence index from Mur-
ray and Schaller (2010); blood distance is the Euclidian distance of frequency of blood types A and B in a 
given country relative to their frequency in the USA. Over-id test p-value reports the p-value for the ove-
ridentifying restriction tests that instruments are correctly excluded. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Dependent variable: polity score OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individualism 0.104*** 0.143*** 0.166*** 0.130** 0.214*** 0.263***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.055) (0.039) (0.046)
Ethnical fractionalization − 5.078 − 2.677
(4.272) (4.201)
Cultural fractionalization − 2.795 − 2.182
(5.956) (5.444)
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization 0.896 − 0.202
(4.072) (3.663)
Education index 16.320*** 15.027***
(3.485) (4.130)
Openness 0.012 0.019*
(0.011) (0.011)
Observations 91 77 92 91 77 92
R2 0.494 0.382 0.342 0.489 0.336 0.252
1st stage F-stat 17.05 45.67 26.95
1st stage Partial  R2 0.250 0.550 0.377
Overid test p-value 0.632 0.324 0.492
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resource rents in gross domestic product. Although the point estimates on individualism 
scores are somewhat smaller, the effect continues to by economically and statistically 
significant. In columns 5 and 6, we add controls for education, religion, conflict, and 
Table 6  Individualism and democratization
Fraction of years with democracy
The dependent variable is the number of years since a country has established a democratic regime (the 
number of years with a continuous positive polity score from the Polity IV data base) as a fraction of the 
total number of years the country appears in the polity IV data base. Individualism is Hofstede’s index of 
individualism. Log income per worker: log income (at purchasing power parity) per worker in 2000 from 
the Penn World Tables. Protection against expropriation risk (ICRG, average 1985–2009). Ethnical, cul-
tural and ethno-linguistical fractionalization are from Fearon (2003). Education: World Bank Human 
Development Report Education Index (average 1980–2005). Natural resource rent is the sum of oil rents, 
natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents. This variable is measured in per-
cent of GDP (average over 1980–2010) and taken from the World Development Indicators. Share of Mus-
lim population is from Barro and McCleary (2003) and refers to 1970. Controls low risk of: cross-border 
conflict, civil disorder, ethnic tensions and war (ICRG, average 1985–2009) are included but not reported. 
Instrumental variables for individualism: historical pathogens is the Historical Pathogen prevalence index 
from Murray and Schaller (2010); blood distance is the Euclidian distance of frequency of blood types A 
and B in a given country relative to their frequency in the USA. Over-id test p-value reports the p-value for 
the overidentifying restriction tests that instruments are correctly excluded. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Dependent variable: fraction 
of years with democracy
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individualism 1.128*** 1.562*** 0.734*** 1.380*** 0.674*** 0.960***
(0.173) (0.270) (0.206) (0.386) (0.224) (0.300)
Log income per worker 8.273* 1.664 16.314** 13.681*
(4.913) (6.326) (7.797) (7.262)
Protection against expropria-
tion risk
2.141** 2.376** 1.276 1.482
(1.001) (1.059) (1.120) (1.063)
Natural resource rent − 0.837*** − 0.487 − 0.140 − 0.042
(0.313) (0.393) (0.380) (0.361)
Education index − 53.955* − 63.253**
(29.397) (25.968)
Ethnic fractionalization 8.155 12.232
(25.278) (24.146)
Cultural fractionalization − 14.509 − 9.867
(36.542) (32.714)
Ethno-linguistic fractionaliza-
tion
− 8.628 − 18.067
(23.211) (21.690)
Share of Muslim − 59.923*** − 60.705***
(12.643) (11.421)
Observations 92 92 91 91 77 77
R2 0.380 0.342 0.501 0.439 0.653 0.642
1st stage F-stat 28.81 14.05 17.81
1st stage Partial  R2 0.392 0.273 0.395
Overid test p-value 0.387 0.814 0.837
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measures of ethnic/cultural/linguistic fractionalization. In all these regressions individu-
alism always has a significant effect on the length of democracy.
We did not make any assumptions in the model about whether collectivist cultures have 
a higher probability of successful collective action compared ( qC ) to individualist cultures 
( qI ), and our main result did not hinge on this. It would nevertheless be useful to see if the 
data can give us some indication about whether there is more collective action under col-
lectivism. In relation to this, we investigate whether collectivist autocracies have a higher 
likelihood of breakdown, be it through mass protests or coups, which would tend to sug-
gest that there is more collective action success in more collectivist countries. In order to 
do this, we rely on the database assembled by Geddes et al. (2014). This database focuses 
on autocracies and, to our knowledge, is the best source documenting transitions from an 
autocratic regime to either democracy or another autocracy.
We define the probability of an autocracy breakdown as the number of autocracy break-
downs (coups, revolutions, elections, etc.) divided by the number of years a country has been 
under autocracy. This statistic from the Geddes et al. (2014) comes the closest to our param-
eter qk . Figure 3 shows that there is a clear negative correlation between individualism and 
autocracy breakdown. In Table 7, we provide some regressions using autocracy breakdown 
as the dependent variable and the set of controls identical to those in Table 6. In all specifica-
tions the coefficient for individualism is negative, suggesting that among countries with an 
autocratic regime, those having a collectivist culture are more likely to experience autocracy 
breakdown. The coefficient is significant in all OLS regressions, but the IV coefficients are 
mostly not significant. The evidence presented here is weaker than in previous tables, but 
overall tends to suggest that there may be less collective action failure in collectivist cultures.
Importantly, the Geddes et al. (2014) database also makes it possible to analyze transitions 
from autocracy to autocracy and transitions from autocracy to democracy. The model clearly 
predicts that, in collectivist societies, there will be more transitions from bad autocracies to 
good autocracies because 𝜎C > 𝜎I ). While it is difficult to distinguish empirically “bad” and 
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Fig. 3  Individualism and the probability of autocratic breakdown. Notes: Probability of autocracy break-
down is the fraction of years when a country has a change of autocrats conditional on starting as an autoc-
racy. Source: Geddes et al. (2014)
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“good” autocrats, we can examine the link between individualism and collectivism and the 
probability of regime changes. We define the probability of autocratic transition as the propor-
tion of autocracy breakdowns leading to autocracy in a country. Because these variables are 
likely to very often take the value of 0 or 100, we performed tobit regressions with censoring 
points at 0 and 100. The results are presented in Tables 8, where we take the same controls as 
in Table 7. We observe clearly that transitions from autocracy to autocracy are significantly 
negatively associated with individualism (and thus positively associated with collectivism) in 
Table 7  Probability of autocracy breakdown and individualism
The dependent variable is the probability of breakdown of autocracy for a country based on the dataset 
in Geddes et  al. (2014). Individualism is Hofstede’s index of individualism. Log income per worker: log 
income (at purchasing power parity) per worker in 2000 from the Penn World Tables. Protection against 
expropriation risk (ICRG, average 1985–2009). Ethnical, cultural and ethno-linguistical fractionalization 
are from Fearon (2003). Education: World Bank Human Development Report Education Index (average 
1980–2005). Natural resource rent is the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), min-
eral rents, and forest rents. This variable is measured in percent of GDP (average over 1980–2010) and 
taken from the World Development Indicators. Share of Muslim population is from Barro and McCleary 
(2003) and refers to 1970. Controls low risk of: cross-border conflict, civil disorder, ethnic tensions and war 
(ICRG, average 1985–2009) are included but not reported. Instrumental variables for individualism: histori-
cal pathogens is the Historical Pathogen prevalence index from Murray and Schaller (2010); blood distance 
is the Euclidian distance of frequency of blood types A and B in a given country relative to their frequency 
in the USA. Over-id test p-value reports the p-value for the overidentifying restriction tests that instruments 
are correctly excluded. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Dependent variable: probability of 
autocracy breakdown
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individualism − 0.068 0.026 − 0.120** − 0.120 − 0.141** − 0.130*
(0.047) (0.070) (0.048) (0.074) (0.056) (0.071)
Log income per worker 2.847* 2.847* 3.101* 3.045**
(1.508) (1.624) (1.595) (1.452)
Protection against expropriation risk − 0.435 − 0.435 − 0.555 − 0.543*
(0.291) (0.295) (0.350) (0.308)
Natural resource rent − 0.069 − 0.069 − 0.114 − 0.111
(0.057) (0.053) (0.093) (0.076)
Education index 4.114 3.751
(8.799) (7.477)
Ethnic fractionalization 3.843 3.925
(4.527) (3.965)
Cultural fractionalization − 1.205 − 1.074
(6.280) (5.480)
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization 0.627 0.410
(4.577) (4.184)
Share of Muslim 1.436 1.293
(4.059) (3.427)
Observations 63 63 62 62 55 55
R2 0.374 0.337 0.439 0.439 0.416 0.415
1st stage F-stat 12.02 10.70 15.10
1st stage Partial  R2 0.368 0.283 0.407
Overid test p-value 0.978 0.713 0.763
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all specifications. Hence, both the polity data and the Geddes et al. (2014) data on autocracies 
and autocratic transitions give empirical support for these predictions of the model.
5  Conclusions
We have presented a model integrating culture in democratization processes. Assuming 
that a collectivist culture displays a stronger taste for conformity and a stronger aver-
sion to institutional innovation even if it might be better at overcoming collective action 
Table 8  Individualism and transition from autocracy to autocracy (Tobit regressions)
The dependent variable is the probability of transition from autocracy to autocracy for a country after an 
autocracy breakdown, based on the dataset in Geddes et  al. (2014). Individualism is Hofstede’s index of 
individualism. Log income per worker: log income (at purchasing power parity) per worker in 2000 from 
the Penn World Tables. Protection against expropriation risk (ICRG, average 1985–2009). Ethnical, cul-
tural and ethno-linguistical fractionalization are from Fearon (2003). Education: World Bank Human 
Development Report Education Index (average 1980–2005). Natural resource rent is the sum of oil rents, 
natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents. This variable is measured in per-
cent of GDP (average over 1980–2010) and taken from the World Development Indicators. Share of Mus-
lim population is from Barro and McCleary (2003) and refers to 1970. Controls low risk of: cross-border 
conflict, civil disorder, ethnic tensions and war (ICRG, average 1985–2009) are included but not reported. 
Instrumental variables for individualism: historical pathogens is the Historical Pathogen prevalence index 
from Murray and Schaller (2010); blood distance is the Euclidian distance of frequency of blood types 
A and B in a given country relative to their frequency in the USA. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Dependent variable: prob-
ability of transition from 
autocracy to autocracy
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individualism − 5.941*** − 7.978*** − 3.830*** − 5.738*** − 3.807*** − 3.837**
(1.591) (2.276) (1.172) (1.876) (1.056) (1.618)
Log income per worker − 45.862 − 21.929 2.704 3.147
(27.899) (32.396) (35.761) (37.574)
Protection against expro-
priation risk
5.561 4.284 − 0.706 − 0.738
(5.338) (5.644) (5.398) (5.527)
Natural resource rent 6.118*** 5.101*** 4.270*** 4.258***
(1.870) (1.750) (1.597) (1.531)
Education index − 121.069 − 120.917
(126.738) (126.984)
Ethnic fractionalization − 66.145 − 66.286
(84.370) (86.239)
Cultural fractionalization 70.798 70.052
(118.219) (123.922)
Ethno-linguistic fraction-
alization
95.526 96.131
(92.415) (95.123)
Share of Muslim 123.272** 123.113**
(58.435) (58.653)
Observations 84 84 83 83 72 72
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problems, the model predicts that, starting from autocracy as the initial regime, an indi-
vidualistic culture will have a higher likelihood of switching to democracy than a col-
lectivist culture. The reason is that a collectivist culture will tend to stick to a “good” 
non-predatory autocracy, which will not be the case with an individualistic culture.
Predictions of the model have strong, robust support in the data, controlling for exist-
ing determinants identified in the literature. To the extent one believes our instrumen-
tal variable analysis, these effects may be interpreted as causal. Using long-difference 
regressions, we also find long-run effects of individualism on polity scores. Using the 
Geddes et al. (2014) data base on autocracies, we also found that collectivist autocra-
cies have higher frequency of regime breakdowns than individualist autocracies. Con-
sistent with the model, collectivist countries are more likely to experience a transition 
towards autocracy while individualist countries are more likely to experience a transi-
tion towards democracy.
Our theoretical and empirical results have important implications. In particular, as 
countries with collectivist cultures develop economically, they will not necessarily evolve 
towards democracy or might do so more slowly or possibly only under the effect of an 
exceptional crisis. This implication is in stark contrast with modernization theories. Coun-
tries like China, Vietnam or Singapore, which have experienced considerable economic 
success in recent decades have not adopted Western-style democracies. Similarly, countries 
that have experienced a genuine democratization process like Taiwan, Thailand, Indone-
sia and Korea have done so relatively recently and their average polity score over the last 
30 years have not been better than Guatemala, Panama or Peru. Another implication of the 
model is that in the long run, we should observe only stable democracies and stable “good” 
autocracies. Testing such a prediction and analyzing factors affecting political stability is 
beyond the scope of this paper.
We must nevertheless be very cautious in interpreting these implications. There are 
many determinants of democracy and culture is only one of those forces. Our research nev-
ertheless suggests that the role of culture, and in particular of individualism and collectiv-
ism as fundamental cultural dimension, cannot be ignored in understand democratization 
processes.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 Under a good ruler, the poor prefer not to revolt if:
Using the expression for VGR − VB = yP + 훽
(
1 − qk
)(
VGR − VB
)
=
yP
1−훽(1−qk)
 we get
Since the right hand side of the inequality is equal to VGR , we have that
VGN =
yP
1 − 훽
≥ VGR = y
P + 훽
{
qk휎k
[
훼VGR + (1 − 훼)VB
]
+ qk
(
1 − 휎k
)
VD +
(
1 − qk
)
VGR
}
VGN ≥ VGR
⇔
yP
1 − 훽
≥ yP + 훽
{
qk휎k훼
yP
1 − 훽
(
1 − qk
) + qk휎k
(
VGR −
yP
1 − 훽
(
1 − qk
)
)
+ qk
(
1 − 휎k
)
VD +
(
1 − qk
)
VGR
}
⇔
yP
1 − 훽
≥ yP + 훽
{
qk
(
1 − 휎k
)
VD − (1 − 훼)qk휎k
yP
1 − 훽
(
1 − qk
) + (1 − qk(1 − 휎k))VGR
}
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A quick look at this last inequality shows several things. First, a high degree of conformity 
(a high 휎k ) implies the preference not to revolt. With 휎k → 1,
Note now that when 휎k is low and tends towards zero, there will be a strict preference to 
revolt. Indeed, in that case:
The latter inequality is always satisfied as democracy brings positive redistribution to the 
poor. Since VGN > VGR for high values of 휎k and VGN < VGR for low values of 휎k and since 
𝜕VGR
𝜕𝜎k
< 0 , by continuity, there exists a threshold value ?̄?k , at which the poor are indifferent 
between revolting and not revolting. Above ?̄?k , they prefer not to revolt against a good auto-
crat, and below ?̄?k they prefer to revolt against a good autocrat. □
Proof of Proposition 2 Under a collectivist culture with a high enough 휎k above ?̄?k such 
that the poor decide not to revolt, the probability of ending up with a democratic regime 
after t periods can be shown to be equal to
When t → ∞ , the probability of having democracy converges to
Note that this expression tends towards zero as 휎k → 1.Under an individualist culture with 
a low enough 휎k such that the poor decide to revolt against any type of dictator, the prob-
ability of ending up with a democratic regime after t periods can be shown to be equal to
With t → ∞ , the probability of having democracy converges to qk(1−휎k)
1−qk휎k
 which is strictly 
positive as long as qk > 0.Compare now the probability of an individualistic culture (with 
휎k below ?̄?k ) and the probability of a collectivist culture (with 휎k above ?̄?k ) of ending up 
with democracy as t → ∞ . A country with an individualistic culture will have a higher 
probability of ending up with democracy than a country with a collectivist culture as long 
as
VGN ≥ VGR
⇔
yP
1 − 훽
≥
1
1 − 훽
(
1 − qk
(
1 − 휎k
))
{
yP + 훽
[
qk
(
1 − 휎k
)
VD − (1 − 훼)qk휎k
yP
1 − 훽
(
1 − qk
)
]}
VGR →
1
1 − 𝛽
{
yP − 𝛽(1 − 𝛼)qk
yP
1 − 𝛽
(
1 − qk
)
}
<
yP
1 − 𝛽
VGR →
1
1 − 훽
(
1 − qk
){yP + 훽qkVD} ≥ yP
1 − 훽
= VGN ⇔ VD ≥ VGN
(1 − 훼)qk
(
1 − 휎k
) t∑
j=0
{
qk휎k(1 − 훼)
}j
(1 − 훼)qk
(
1 − 휎k
)
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One verifies that this inequality is strictly satisfied as long as α > 0 (Tables 9, 10). □
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